Hume explicitly recognized both the indeterministic and hypothetical types of explicantia for the concept of liberty. In the Treatise, Hume distinguished between the liberty of indifference and the liberty of spontaneity. The first is opposed to necessity or causation, and the second is opposed to 'violence.' Hume argued that spontaneity is the most common sense of the word 'liberty' and that it is this sense that we ought to be concerned to preserve. On the ground that necessity (analyzed Humeanly as constant conjunc tion) applies to human actions, Hume argued that the liberty of indifference does not really exist in actuality, even though we must recognize it is a concept in order to unravel the verbal confusions in the language of the freedom-deter minism d e b a t e . T h u s in the Inquiry, Hume defines liberty as the power of acting or not acting according to the deter minations of the will. That is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Interest ingly, he noted that this kind of liberty is hypothetical. He also observed that this kind of liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is "not a prisoner and in chains."11 Hume is well known for his remarkable ability to set out clearly issues that have since become crucial philos ophical controversies, and this issue is no exception. Current analyses of power concepts have as the fulcrum of controversy the indeterministic-hypothetical dichotomy, and this is the very same distinction that Hume drew as indiff erence-spontaneity.
The Lehrer-Aune controversy is based on the assumption that the analysans of the hypothetical analysis expresses a counterfactual conditional. But now the question arises: What if we assume that the analysans is not a counterfactual conditional at all? The answer seems to be that the hypo thetical analysis is vindicated, since it would now be impervious to the Lehrer counter-example. But it is easily seen that the plausibility of (E3 ) is only superficial. Supposing I usually sink that kind of putt, but that today I have a broken a m .
Now there are two obvious ways to set up a hypothetical analysis that is open to interpretation as noncounterfactual. (E2 ) S can do x = (jf S will do x (every time
In this case, despite the truth of the proposition that I usually sink them, I may not be justified in saying that I can sink this one. It may be perfectly apparent that I can't. The hypotheticalist will reply that this is not a fair example, since one of the circumstances of the case is different. The reply is that this just proves that usually doing x is not a sufficient condition, by itself, of being able to do x. Some additional factor taking into account changes of circumstance in different cases must be inserted into the right side of (E3 ). Furthermore, it is by no means appar ent just how this is to be done. Exactly how similar must the circumstances be? It is reasonable to expect that this will prove a difficult question to answer.
The hypotheticalist argument here is something like the argument that induction is simply, enumeration. The reply is that simple enumeration is not a sufficient condition of an inductively correct argument, since other factors must be taken into account, such as whether the cases enumerated constitute an adequate sample of the class that is being projected onto. Similarly, it is a fact about the verifica tion of can-statements that simple enumeration of instances is not sufficient. The instances must be sufficiently like the case in question to justify the assertion of the canstatement.
side would be true. In other words, according to (E3 ), if I don't try to do something at all, it follows that I can do it. Surely this is an absurd consequence. Now Nowell-Smith can reply that the IF isn't that kind of IF. But then the question is "Just what kind of IF is it?" If it is a counterfactual IF then (E3 ) collapses back into the Lehrer-Aune type of analysis that we have already dealt with. If it is neither of these types of IF, then it calls for a good deal of additional clarification, to put it mildly, if it is to function as part of an analysans for CAN.
On the other hand, what if we take the opposite tack and declare that in the case where I don't try at all, the propo sition that I usually succeed if I try is false (not true, as in the alternative above), on the ground that the number of instances of its occurrence has failed to reach a certain level. The hypothetical analysis purports to claim that my usually succeeding if I try is a necessary condition of my being able to do something. So perhaps the hypotheticalist wants to say that, where I don't try at all, it's not true to say that I usually succeed if I try. Hence, in this case it follows that I can't do the thing in question. But this consequence is equally unpalatable. Just because I have never actually tried to lift this pencil in front of me, it does not follow that I can't lift it. Surely it is not a necessary condition of my being able to do some thing that I have actually tried doing it. I may never have tried it, yet be perfectly justified in asserting my ability to do it. Perhaps all that is shown is that the conditional is not meant to be applied to individual cases. But how are such cases to be analyzed? These considerations lead me to think that the non-counterfactual version of the hypothetical analysis is even less hopeful than the counterfactual version. Certainly (E3 ) as it stands faces very serious objections. A more recent version of (E3 ), while perhaps tenable as an equivalence, suffers the same difficulties as an analysis of ability:12 (E4 ) A has the ability to = df A is in a certain condition, C (C being the appropriate state of the organism brought to a certain pitch of devel opment) , such that, given opportunity, C causes A to succeed in x'ing an appropriate percentage of the time (where the appropriate percentage is determined by the unspecified complexity of C), if he should try to x.
The most serious problem here, as with (E3), is the charac terization of C. It is simply not clear that there is any state C that corresponds to an ability, and the idea that we might measure the complexity of C seems simply absurd. The usefulness of (E4) as providing a reduction schema for abilities may be vindicated by empirical research (insofar as it is helpful to think of an organism as having an input, a state and an output that is a probability function of these two factors) if isolable physical states of the organism can be identified with abilities, but this remains dubious. Thus as a reduction schema for abilities, (E4) may have some potential plausibility, but as an analysis, it is vitiated by the evident lack of criteria for C; it begs the question. We should also observe that empirical research may tend to lead us to reject C. Many abilities may not be correlatable with anything we might call "a state of the organism" in which case the model for ability along the lines of (E4) might consist in Rylean summary dispositions, i.e., the ability of x to do A might be described as a probabilistic function of x to respond to certain stimuli without postulating any unidentified states of the organism.
Thus we might provisionally adopt (E4) as providing a rough starting point, an initial proposal for a reduction schema for ability statements. We will find in the course of further investigations that further refinements of it are necessary. One point to note before passing on is that the conditional in the right side of (E4) is undefined.
The inability of (E4) to distinguish between "having an ability" and "being able" (Kaufman argues that the ability to speak a language and the "ability" to lift a pencil are both abilities) generates a minor problem. Suppose that a golfer becomes dizzy for a short interval, II, as a result of taking a slight overdose of tranquilizers. During II, his body is, let us assume, not in the appropriate state C that causes him to get off a straight long drive if he should try. According to (E4), during II he temporarily lacked the ability, i.e., we could say, of Jones during II, 'He lacks the ability to drive straight and long.' The counterintuitiveness of this consequence suggests that we might, if possible, make a distinction that would allow us to say 'He had the ability during II, but was not able to exercise it.' Let us now turn to proposals of Sellars and Chisholm that enable us to deal with this difficulty, which is located in (E4) in the undefined expression 'opportun ity. ' Sellars' account of ability is prolific in its intro duction of new concepts--he defines four concepts that may 218 c-12 be loosely called types of ability.
In order to under stand these four definitions, we must understand some other concepts which Sellars utilizes as primitives. The complex ity of Sellars' account is somewhat formidable, and there fore to clearly recapitulate his views ought to be of some value. I for one feel that Sellars has managed to articulate nicely a number of concepts that are commonly found in inchoate form in the vast literature on determinism and action, and that his views are uniquely worth studying. First Sellars introduces the physical or causal modalities. He uses N for 'physically necessary' and M for 'physically possible.' Thus we have three types of necessity (p. 163).
(a) Absolute necessity.
It is absolutely physically necessary that whenever there is lightning, it thunders. 
N [ (t) L (t) T (t + A t) )

C-13
On the basis of these terms, the expression 'x is able to do A at t' is defined.
ABLE [A (x,t)] = df N [ VA (x,t') > A (x,t)]
Thus a person is able to do an action at t if, were he to will at t' to do A, he would do A at t.
Essentially, what Sellars has done so far is to propose the hypothetical analysis, incorporating in it the primi tive concepts of willing and physical necessity. Thus the value of his proposal is directly dependent upon the via bility of these two concepts for Action Theory. Reserv ations about both these concepts are widespread and serious, 4 and thus, for many action theorists, the acceptability of Sellars' scheme is not likely to be more than tentative. There have been proposals for theories of physical necessity, but none is by any means unproblematic. Indeed, all the old familiar problems of causation and explanation are built into the very concept of physical necessity, and hence many critics would want to say that Sellars' account of ABLE begs the question: to utilize a concept like physical necessity (undefined) in an account of ability is a blatant and utterly damning circularity. On the other hand, there are those who will regard the Sellars definition of ABLE as an advance on the ground that physical necessity may be ultimately a viable concept. Even more philosophical hackles will be raised by the concept of willing. Those with inclinations to behaviorism may regard the introduction of this concept as wilful obscurantism. I myself am inclined to feel that the difficulties in verification of sentences containing "willing" make this concept seem unlikely to be scientifically useful as an adjunct to Action Theory.15 Nevertheless, let us concede Sellars' use of 4The resistance of "physical" or "causal" necessity to analysis has been notorious since Hume. ■^Hume defined the will (Treatise, op. c i t .', 399) as "the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind." Yet it seems questionable whether we ever have such an impression, or how we might know that we are having one. Mill also argued that volition is a C-14 these two primitives for the moment to see what he gener ates from them, as this will prove philosophically inter esting even granting our reservations about some specifics of this way of proceeding.
First Sellars adds some notation.
' P ' stands for kinds of circumstance.
'll' is a variable for periods of time.
Thus ' P » (x,II) ' is to be read: x is in P throughout II. 
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For x to be able to do A means that he is both in a posi tion to do A and that he can do A, Thus the account of ABLE we encountered earlier,
ABLE [ A(x,t)] = N [ VA (x,t') + A(x,t) ],
is no doubt supposed to be a consequence of the definitions of ABLE and CAN (see below).
Finally, we ought to observe, at the risk of introducing too many complications, that Sellars introduces yet another ability concept more towards the end of his paper (p. 173) which he calls a broader concept than any of the previous ones. Sellars does not say what 0 stands for, but it seems that he means this variable to range over "states." He defines CAP, which I take to refer to "capability" as: 
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As there is possibility of confusion of CAN with Sellars' first concept under consideration, ABLE, it will be well to try to ascertain the difference between these two concepts. ABLE is defined as: 
N [ VA (x,II) + A (x,II) ]
Thus one can see the contrast with CAN quite clearly. Evi dently Sellars means to say that you have the ability to do something if, and only if (roughly) if you are in a position to do it then, if you will to do it you will do it. But in order to be able to do it, it is required, in addition, that you actually be in a position to do it. Ability is more iffy than being able, in other words.
Now let us see how Sellars' version of CAN fares against the Lehrer-Chisholm counter-example.
Let us envision the familiar case where x can't do A because he can't will to do A, but where he would do A if he were to will to. This seems to provide no problem for Sellars since the right side of his definition of ABLE requires that x be in a position to do A, and this seems not to obtain, since if x can't will to do A then he is not in a position to do A. But we must recall that Sellars' definition of POSIT merely requires that no circumstances physically compossible with his willing to do A rule out x's doing A. And clearly, in the Lehrer-Chisholm model, if x can't will to do A, this may well mean that it is physically incompossible to will to A, i.e., that x's willing to do A is physically impossible with any circumstances, or, in particular, the circumstances in question. Thus we may envision a Lehrer-Chisholm model where the left side of the ABLE-equivalence is false and the right side is true, x is not able to do A, because it is physically impossible for him to will to do A but (i) he is in a position to do A since (while there are circumstances 227 
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that physically necessitate his failure to will to do A) there are no circumstances compossible with his willing to do A that physically necessitate his failure to do A, and (ii) his willing to do A physically necessitates his doing A.
Sellars' reply to this, judging from his remarks, would be that it does not make sense to talk of it being physic ally impossible to will. Willings, in the Sellars scheme of things, are not actions or events (see section II of 'Fatalism and Determinism'), and therefore, presumably, it does not make sense to speak of them in action terms such as physical necessitation. Accordingly, Sellars had defined a broader sense of 'be able' which we have already examined, CAP, which applies to willing. But of course this would be absurd. Now Sellars will probably want to reply that ' -> ' is not material implica tion. But our question now is: what sort of conditional is it? This must be answered. The second problem for Sellars is that POSIT and ABLE overlap perhaps rather more than he might think. All cases of ABLE are also cases of POSIT (by definition of ABLE), but the converse also obtains for nearly all cases. Presumably the only cases where x is in a position to do A but is not able to do A are cases where x cannot will to do A (i.e,, cases like the LehrerChisholm counter-example). Such cases are, however, some what rare, and thus for nearly all occurrences, POSIT and ABLE both obtain, i.e., nearly all occurrences of 'can,' 'be able,' etc. will, according to Sellars' account, be ambiguous. Therefore one can't help really feeling that POSIT and ABLE do much the same job, and might better be treated as competing hypotheses rather than as complement ary ones in the Humean fashion, and that Sellars' way of mapping the geography of power-concepts might not be the best possible way. His example here suggests that he interprets the quantifier in the more usual sense: 'He undertakes to make it happen that his arm goes up' means 'There is a p such that he makes it happen that p in the endeavor to make it happen that his arm goes up.' Conversely, he makes it happen that p means that there is a q such that he makes it happen that p in the endeavor to make it happen that q: (D 2) He makes it happen that P = (3 q) (M p,q)
Thus 'He makes it happen that his arm goes up' means 'There is a state such that he makes it happen that his arm goes up in the endeavor to make this state happen.' In short, to act is to endeavor to make happen. Hence an action, for Chisholm, is always purposive. Although this is not an unfamiliar move, it leads to an unintuitive concept of action, as observed by Davidson.19
Next Chisholm distinguishes between the power of under taking (which he also calls 'freedom of undertaking') and the power of making happen, and defines the second concept utilizing the first. Then he distinguishes, relative to the second kind of power, between those things that are directly and indirectly in the agent's power to make happen. Thus there are two main definitions: (D 8 ) It is within his power to undertake to make it happen that p = df There is no sufficient causal condition at or prior to t for his not undertaking at t to make it happen that p.
• 
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(D 9) It is directly within his power at t to make it happen that p = df There is a q such that (i) it is within his power at t to undertake to make it happen that q, and (ii) if he were to undertake at t to make it happen that q, he would make it happen that p in the endeavor at t to make it happen that q.
Next consider a relation R p, q to read 'making p happen causes it to be directly in the agent's power to make q happen.' This relation is presumably transitive. Thus if we postulate a series of such relations where the initial argument is p and the terminating argument q, and p is directly within the agent's power, then the series obtains if, and only if, it is indirectly within the agent's power to make it happen that q. Thus it is indirectly within the agent's power to make it happen that q if, and only if, p is directly within the agent's power and Yet it must be clearly seen that (D8 ) defines the power of undertaking, not the power of doing generally. These two concepts would not appear to be equivalent, since, as we saw earlier, I may have the power to undertake to do A without actually having the power to do A. The converse obtains however. According to Chisholm,20 whenever I have the power to do A it follows that there is no sufficient causal condition for my not undertaking to do A, i.e., by definition, I have the power to undertake to make it happen that A. But if I have the power to undertake to make it happen that A, it does not follow that I have the power to make A happen. As we saw earlier, it seems that I might even be said to have the power to undertake to make it happen that A and ^ A in certain cases, say where there is some A' such that I undertake to do A' in the endeavor to make it happen that A. ^ A (not realizing that nothing can ever make it happen that A. 
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there can be no sufficient condition for my not undertaking to do A. if I actually undertake to make it happen that A.
a . Thus in virtue of the general principle that if I actually do A it follows that I have the power to do A (at least at that time), we can infer that if I do undertake to make it happen that A.
A, it follows that I have the power to undertake to make it happen that A.
A. In general I have the power to undertake to make anything at all. A, happen (by D8 ) provided only that there is some A' such that there is no sufficient causal condition for my not making it happen that A' in the endeavor to make it happen that A. The proviso is thus dual: 1. A ' must be causally possible, and 2. The agent must do A* in the endeavor to do A. The point to appreciate and remember is that the second condi tion is subjectively epistemic-it relates only to the agent's subjective estimate of the situation. The agent may quite irrationally or ignorantly set out to undertake to make A' happen in the endeavor to make A happen where an objective estimate of the situation might demonstrate the impossibility of any causal propensity of A' to lead to A. Another consequence of (D8 ) is less tractable. It seems that, according to (D8 ), I may have the power to undertake to make it happen that I undertake nothing. Intuitively it seems reasonable that I could never have such a power since what I endeavor, namely my undertaking nothing, is defeated logically by my undertaking it. In Chisholm's notation the expression 'I undertake nothing' is rendered as: , r) '. But the problem here is that m . is logically equivalent to '( V p) ^ ( 3 q) (M p, q), which is inconsistent logically with there being some r to which <**■ bears the relation M. In any case, most of us would likely grant that there is something peculiar about ever allowing that one might have the power to undertake to make it happen that one undertake nothing. Yet (D8 ) allows this, since there is no sufficient causal condition for my not undertaking to make it happen that I undertake nothing. The sentence 'I undertake to make it happen that I under take nothing' is perfectly causally consistent, by itself, although it is logically inconsistent, according to Chisholm's definition of 'undertaking.' This problem is introduced by Chisholm's exclusion of the concept of sufficient logical condition from his concept of sufficient causal condition. He explicitly states this in his paper, 'He Could Have Done Otherwise' (Brand, o£. cit., 298): "If C is a sufficient causal condition for E, then C is a set of events no member of which begins after E begins and which is such that, it is a law of nature, but not a law of logic, that if C were to occur then E would occur." This account of the matter effectively rules out that C is ever a sufficient causal condition of itself, thus bypassing the difficulty that we found in Sellars' definition of POSIT. Without going into the matter further here, my inclination is to agree with Chisholm that logical sufficiency ought to be excluded from the definiens as the consequences of including it may be even more troublesome than the diffi culty above.
But how does (D9) stack up against the problems that faced Sellars' ABLE? Well first, (D9) is not affected by the Lehrer-Chisholm counter-example. Let us try to set up a case for (D9) analogous to the case where I can't take a candy ball because I can't choose to take one, although I would take one if I chose to. Let us say that there is some q such that if I were to undertake to make q happen, I would make it happen that I took a red candy ball in the endeavor to make it happen that q. But it is not within my power to take one because it is not within my power to make q happen. But the last move is blocked by proviso (i) in (D9). In order for the situation, as envisioned, to satisfy the definiens it must be within my power to make it happen that q, as stated by (i). Thus the Chisholm-Taylor counter-example does not seem to be damaging to (D9), at least in any obvious way. And proviso (i), moreover, is itself free from the difficulties of Sellars' POSIT, phrased as (D9) is in terms of undertaking. Thus (D9) seems to be unexceptionable aside from the problems introduced via (D8 ). Observe, however, that the conditional on the right side of (D9) is undefined-that is (D9) is phrased simply in terms of the English expression 'if , . . then.' This does not detract from its possible soundness as an "equivalence" (in English), but debilitates it as an explication.
An important advantage of the Chisholm scheme over Sellars' scheme is that the relation M has more known properties than Sellars' concept of volition. Although Sellars explicitly denies that volitions are actions or events, I retain a queasy feeling about such entities, given recent diatribes against them, and am inclined to prefer Chisholm's M since it seems less mysterious. Yet there are two difficulties with Chisholm's program that ought to be pointed out as areas for further exploration and debate. First, quantification over "states of affairs" strikes me as somewhat cavalier, and I feel that further clarification of the expression 'state of affairs' is required. Is a state of affairs a space-time zone? Further, might it not be possible to eliminate states of affairs in favor of sentences, so that M p,q might be read as 'He makes it happen that p be true in the endeavor to make q true.' I detect that Chisholm might not be averse to this 
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if they are susceptible to reduction to empirical concepts or to more familiar scientific constructs. Otherwise, there is some substance to the behaviorist charge that such con cepts are as unhelpful as the concept of entelechy in biology. According to Skinner, "so long as the findings and methods of science are applied to human affairs only in a sort of remedial patchwork, we may continue to hold any view of human nature we like. But as the use of science increases, we are forced to accept the theoretical struc ture with which science represents its fact."27 A more standard psychological account of the concept of ability is to treat it as an operational concept. Roughly speaking, this means that given certain test conditions, if a subject performs in a certain way then he has a certain ability. The test conditions are never completely specified, for all cases of ability, so that as we construct new tests for ability, we find out more and more about ability. Thus the operational definition has the logical form 'Q^ (Q2 => 0 types of ability. How factors should be identified and named is somewhat controversial. But it is clear, according to P. E. Vernon, that a factor is not to be identified with a "faculty which is hypothetical mental power."30 Rather a factor is a set of correlations in a battery of tests that allows the classification of the tests into a category or underlying factor. These methods appear to favor an operational approach to the definition of ability. Yet, as Baldwin observes, a model for ability is surprisingly lacking in the literature-concepts such as drive, habit, anticipatory goal response and secondary reinforcement have emerged while an "ability" concept has not.31 This suggests to Baldwin that a purely logical and theoretical analysis of the concept of ability might prove to be very fruitful as a supplement to existing empirical studies in the area. Thus the Sellars-Chisholm type of Action Theory is a step in more or less the right direction and might prove fruitful with more coordinated guidance from psychology and modal logic. B. F. Skinner has suggested a solution, or perhaps a dissolution of the problem that is paradoxical, yet suggests a different way of looking at it.
In the present analysis we cannot distinguish between involuntary and voluntary behavior by raising the issue of who is in control. It does not matter whether behavior is due to a willing individual or a psychic usurper if we dismiss all inner agents of whatever sort. Nor can we make the distinction on the basis of control or lack of control, since we assume that no behavior is free. If we have no reason to distinguish between being able to do something and doing it, such expres sions as "not being able to do something" or "not being able to help doing something" must be interpreted in some other way. When all relevant variables have been arranged, an organism will or will not respond. If it does not, it cannot. If it can, it will. To ask whether someone can turn a handspring is merely to ask whether there are circumstances under which he will do so. A man who can avoid flinching at gunfire is a man who will not flinch under certain circumstances. A man who can hold still while a dentist works on his teeth is one who holds still upon certain occasions.32 3Op. e . Vernon, The Structure of Human Abilities, Methuen, 1950, p. 8 . 3lBaldwin, o£. cit♦, p. 196.
•^B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, MacMillan, 1953, lllf.
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The paradox is that, according to the proposal, an organism can do anything at all, since there are some circumstances in which the organism will do anything. Thus I can leap over tall buildings in a single bound, according to Skinner's account of be able, since in the circumstance in which I have the requisite properties of Superman and there is an available high building that I am motivated to jump over, I will do so.
(The protest that such circumstances are not possible is not reasonable, since this sense of 'possible' is just what the proposal in question purports to explicate.) If all the circumstances are allowed to be variable, then anything can happen. Clearly Skinner ought to recognize that some circumstances must be assumed to be fixed in the judgment of an ability. Thus it is false that I am able to leap over tall buildings in a single bound, since we can assume that it is a "fixed" circumstance that I do not share certain fantastic properties with Superman. Thus given the present state of the world, it does not follow from the availability of a building and so on that I will jump over. Thus Skinner should say that I am able to do A if, and only if, given a certain fixed set of statements, W, if certain circumstances Y obtain (the independent variables) then I will do A. Now the interesting question that the action theorists are concerned to answer may be formulated:
'How may we characterize sets W and '
Skinner's reply, judging from the above quotation, would likely be the skeptical one that it is simply a matter of context, pragmatics, or our interests of the moment which set of circumstances we include in ¥ . According to Skinner, all contingencies ought to be considered on a par-there are no "internal" contingencies corresponding to abilities and "external" ones corresponding to particular circumstances or opportunities not of the ability type. Physiological and genetic evidence is relevant to abilities, according to Skinner, but in any special way, and even this type of "internal" evidence can be traced to contingencies in the history of the environment of the organism. So Skinner appears to be a skeptic about the Sellars-Chisholm type of program for action theory. For him the Sellarsian distinc tion between ABLE, POSIT and CAN would seem to be a dogma of autonomous man.
Skinner's proposal does provide the outlines of a reduc tion schema for ability-statements but it can hardly be said to offer an analysis. According to our modification of the scheme we may translate an ability statement into the form Broadly speaking, what emerges from our considerations on these existing formalisms is the need to distinguish generally between an "opportunity" concept that relates to the possibility of undertaking a specific spatio-temporally localized action by an agent, and an "ability" concept, an underlying generalized notion of competence concerned with how an agent will generally perform under certain testconditions. The key issue revolves around conceptual diff iculties on talking about relating externally observable behaviors to intentions, capacities, abilities and oppor tunities that cannot be similarly observed. Let us sketch here in bold strokes the basis of the fundamental distinc tion that will help to organize and consolidate our con ceptual gains in facing this important issue. First, the nihil obstat or indeterministic conception is best seen as providing us with a model for exploring the notion of opportunity or being in a position to do x. Here we might suggest, as a basis for further exploration, that this concept might be treated as a modal operator conforming to the following two axioms, where p is a sentence of the form 1x does A . ' 
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(A^) and (A2 ) afford a formal means of decisively distin guishing between posit and abil. posit can be pursued through (A^) and (A 2 ) and further exploration of the nihil obstat model, abil, I would like to suggest, is best pursued along the general lines suggested by the formalisms of Sellers and Chisholm, but without incorporating the undefined concepts of willing or volition. Yet even an awareness of the clear distinction between abil and posit, a familiarity with the basic logical problems of explica tion, as outlined in the foregoing, ought to be sufficient to warrant the belief that this sorely needed distinction is worth pursuing in the direction of an underlying Theory of Action. In the practical world, these problems are of very real importance in understanding the foundations of all the domains of assessment of ability. What exactly are we measuring in an intelligence test? Is it really possible to measure "management ability"? Do children fail to show their intrinsic abilities in school situations because they are not suitably motivated? Are skills really acquired through decisions rather than conditioning? These are important questions that fail to be resolved because no logically consistent or coherent way of talking about their content is available. Out of the controversies between indeterminists and hypotheticalists, a more constructive approach to sorting out the complexities of the logic of ability is needed, with a greater sympathetic rapprochement between Action Theory and the social sciences.
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